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sums involved in these corporate transactions. The injection of this
element of uncertainty'into corporate planning would result in a severe
impediment to the effective use of these tax-free corporate reorganiza-
tions and divisions.
EDGAR M. ROACH JR.
Labor Law-Union Discipline of Supervisor Members
Section 8(b)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,'
(hereinafter called the Act) provides the statutory framework within
which labor unions exercise disciplinary control over their members.'
The general rule, based upon NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Co., 3 is that such discipline is a legitimate, internal union matter rarely
subject to interference from the courts.' A trend' in the courts of appeals
indicates, however, that the Allis-Chalmers doctrine does not apply
where the disciplined member happens to be a supervisor.' In two recent
'National Labor Relations Act §§ 1-18, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
NLRA].
2NLRA § 8(b)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1970) provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agencies-
(1) to restrain or coerce (a) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 157 of this title: Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership therein ....
NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides in part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment ....
3388 U.S. 175 (1967).
4In Allis-Chalmers the union had imposed fines upon employee members who had crossed
picket lines and continued to work during a strike in support of new contract demands. In finding
that the fines did not violate § 8(b)(1)(A), the Court concluded that "Congress did not propose
any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of unions, aside from barring enforcement of a
union's internal regulations to affect a member's employment status." 388 U.S. at 195.
The Allis-Chalmers doctrine had a slight gloss put on it in 1969. In Scofield v. NLRB, 394
U.S. 423 (1969), the Supreme Court added that union fines of members would not viola.
te § 8(b)(l)(A) "unless some impairment of a statutory labor policy [could] be shown." Id. at 432,
5See text accompanying notes 31-35 infra.
'See note 18 and accompanying text infra, regarding supervisors as union members.
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decisions the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
interpreted section 8(b)(1)(B) 7 of the Act as severely limiting-if not
completely proscribing-union discipline of supervisor members.
In Meat Cutters Local 81 v. NLRB,8 Safeway Stores, Inc., the
intervenor, operated several retail stores in the Seattle, Washington,
area. These stores contained meat markets at which meat products were
cut, packaged, and sold. The meat market employees, including supervi-
sors, were covered by contracts between the petitioner union and a
multi-employer bargaining association to which Safeway-belonged. In
July of 1968 Safeway instituted a policy directing its managers, includ-
ing a supervisor, Hall, to obtain certain meats pre-processed from a
central warehouse. The result of this procedure was to eliminate some
union work, for these meats previously had been processed by employee
union members on the premises of the retail outlets.
The union objected to the new policy and ordered its supervisor
members not to follow the directive. Hall disregarded the union's in-
structions and implemented Safeway's policy. For this conduct the
union fined him fifty dollars Safeway promptly filed a section
8(b)(1)(B) charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
The Board issued a cease-and-desist order, thus holding that the union's
disciplinary action against Hall restrained and coerced Safeway in the
selection of its representative for the adjustment of grievances. The
Board further ordered rescission of the disciplinary action, reinstate-
ment to membership, and retroactive effect to any lost benefits. ° The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the
Board's findings and enforced the order."
A few months later the same court again considered a possible
violation of section 8(b)(1)(B) in International Brotherhood of Electrical
7NLRA § 8(b)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1970) provides in part: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(l) to restrain or coerce. . . (B) an employer
in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment
of grievances . .. ."
8458 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
'The union also imposed an additional $I0 fine for failure to appear, as requested, before the
Union Executive Board and ultimately expelled Hall for refusal to pay the fine. This resulted in a
loss of his rights to sickness and death benefits provided through his membership. Although the
bargaining agreement contained a union-shop clause under which the supervisors were required to
become and remain union members, there was no contention that this clause had been breached
by Hall's expulsion. 458 F.2d at 796 n.3.
"0Meat Cutters Local 81, 185 N.L.R.B. 130 (1968).
"458 F.2d at 802.
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Workers v. NLRB.'2 In 1968 Illinois Bell Telephone Company had a
collective bargaining agreement with Local 134, International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), AFL-CIO, similar to that in Meat
Cutters, under which all employees and certain foremen were required
to become union members. During an economic strike IllinoisBell ad-
vised the foremen members that it would like them to cross the picket
line and perform non-supervisory work during the strike. The company
left the decision as to whether to honor the work stoppage to the discre-
tion of each individual foreman. Illinois Bell made it clear that those
who chose to honor the strike would not be penalized. Conversely, the
union advised its membership that any member who chose to work
would be subject to union discipline.
Because of the union threat several of the foremen formed the Bell
Supervisor's Protective Association for the dual purpose of encouraging
other foremen to work and protecting the rights of those who did so.
After the strike the union fined each foreman who worked five hundred
dollars and imposed an additional fine of one thousand dollars on each
of the five foremen who were instrumental in the formation of the
Association. The disciplined members filed a charge with the NLRB
and, as in Meat Cutters, the Board found the fines to be a violation of
section 8(b)(1)(B).13 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
followed its prior decision in Meat Cutters and affirmed. 4
To appreciate fully the reasoning of the NLRB and the court of
appeals in both these cases, it is necessary first to examine briefly the
historical status of supervisors under the law and the development of
section 8(b)(1)(B). The original National Labor Relations Act (the
Wagner Act)15 did not except supervisors from the definition of em-
ployee. They enjoyed all the rights and protection of other employees
under the Act. Unions of supervisory employees such as the Foremen's
Association of America and the United Technical and Supervisory
Employees began to use the new protection to expand membership
greatly. 6 Following passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendment to the Act
in 1947,17 which specifically exempted supervisors, 8 the supervisor un-
"No. 71-1559 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 22, 1972).
"International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 17 (July 14, 1971).
"No. 71-1559, at 35.
"NLRA (Wagner Act), ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 450 (1935).
"See Moore, The National Labor Relations Board and Supervisors, 21 LAn. L.J. 195, 205
(1970).
"Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
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ions began to wither. Supervisory employees began to view themselves
as a part of management. 9 Nevertheless, some employees, particularly
those who had been promoted from the rank and file, took advantage
of section 14(a) of the Act, which permitted them to become or remain
union members, albeit without statutory protection.20
While an estimate of the current number of supervisors who are
union members is unavailable, one may presume that it is sufficiently
large to warrant substantial union interest in maintaining and control-
ling such members. It is also safe to say that the Meat Cutters and
IBEW interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(B) will seriously undermine this
interest.
The District of Columbia Circuit, interpreting legislative history,
stated in both decisions that Congress enacted section 8(b)(1)(B) in
recognition of the fact that unions had begun to pressure management
not to appoint representatives who would be too strict in dealing with
union members.2' While section 8(b)(1)(B) proscribes direct restraint or
coercion against employers in the selection of bargaining representa-
tives, the court felt it was Congress' intent that indirect interference
accomplished through union discipline of an employer's representative
also would be prohibited. 22 This shift of attention to indirect restraint
or coercion is a departure from earlier cases that proscribed direct
interference with the employer's ability to choose his representatives in
actual bargaining situations.
The first reported decision in which a union was found to have
violated section 8(b)(1)(B) was American Newspaper Publishers Asso-
ciation v. NLRB. 23 The union had threatened to strike for a contract
18NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970) provides in part: "The term 'employee'. . . shall
not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor. ... This exempts supervisors from
the protections afforded employees by the Act. However, NLRA § 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 164(a)
(1970) states: "Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becom-
ing or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject to this subchapter
shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose
of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining."
"See Moore, supra note 16, at 203-04.
See note 18 supra. The reasons for retention of union membership by a supervisor are several,
including obtaining additional benefits, maintaining active status in the event of a demotion or
change of jobs requiring union membership, or simply a sense of closeness to members associated
with in the past. See Gould, Some Limitations upon Union Discipline under the National Labor
Relations Act: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1067, 1129 (1970).
2 No. 71-1559, at 13; 458 F.2d at 798 n. 11.
2No. 71-1559, at 9; 458 F.2d at 798.
-193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951).
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clause that would compel the employer to hire only foremen who were
union members. The Seventh Circuit, in affirming the Board's finding
of a violation, was primarily concerned that the union's objective was
to further an illegal closed-shop scheme.24 However, in 1958 in
Typographers Local 38, 2 the NLRB found a strike to obtain a similar
clause to be a violation in itself, absent any other illegal objective. The
decision was subsequently affirmed on this point by an equally divided
Supreme Court.
The few NLRB and courts of appeals decisions handed down dur-
ing the next decade found that the following conduct violated section
8(b)(1)(B): striking to procure the discharge of a labor relations consul-
tant hired by the company to prepare for negotiations; 27 threatening a
work stoppage to force the employer to accept a multi-employer asso-
ciation as his bargaining representative; 8 threatening to strike to force
the employer to abandon such an association;2 and bypassing the repre-
sentative selected by the employer and requiring him to select an-
other."0 In every case the violation involved direct action by the union
against the employer and the actual selection of a bargaining representa-
tive. Not until 1968 did the NLRB turn its attention to a union's use of
its disciplinary machinery over supervisor members.
In San Francisco-Oakland Mailers No. 1831 the Board found a
violation of section 8(b)(1)(B) where the union had called two supervi-
sors to appear before a union investigative committee on charges that
the supervisors had violated the labor agreement by using supervisory
and non-union personnel to do work covered by the agreement. On the
employer's instructions the supervisors refused to appear and were
fined. The Board rejected the union's argument that Allis-Chalmers was
controlling, distinguishing that case as protecting only legitimate inter-
nal union affairs. Here, though, "the relationship primarily affected
[was] one between the union and the employers. '3 The Board also held
that the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) was limited to that section and not
applicable to section 8(b)(1)(B).
211d. at 805.
-123 N.L.R.B. 806 (1959).
2Typographers Local 38 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 705 (1961).
"ILGWU, Los Angeles Cloak Joint Bd., 127 N.L.R.B. 1543 (1960).
2'Painters Dist. Council No. 36, 155 N.L.R.B. 1013 (1965).
"Painters Local 823, 161 N.L.R.B. 620 (1966).
"Plasterers Local 739, 157 N.L.R.B. 823 (1966).
3172 N.L.R.B. 252 (1968).
31d. at -.
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San Francisco-Oakland Mailers was not appealed, and the first
similar decision by the NLRB to be considered by a court of appeals
was NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 49.33 Citing San Francisco-
Oakland Mailers,34 the Tenth Circuit upheld a Board decision that
fining a supervisor for working before the regular work day began was
a violation of section 8(b)(1)(B). Several similar holdings have been
issued by the NLRB, and each has been affirmed by various circuits.1
5
Meat Cutters and IBEW, however, go further than any of the previous
cases in analyzing the intent of Congress in prohibiting indirect as well
as direct interference and distinguishing the application of Allis-
Chalmers.
The majority in IBEW reiterated the earlier proposition in Meat
Cutters that section 8(b)(1)(B) proscribes "indirect union restraint or
coercion of an employer, accomplished through the imposition of disci-
pline upon the employer's representatives for actions performed by them
within the general scope of their supervisory or managerial responsibili-
ties."36 The court did not believe this to be too broad a view of the
meaning Congress intended for the statutory language. 7 The majority
perceived this Congressional intent by examining legislative history sur-
rounding not only the enactment of section 8(b)(l)(B) but the other 1947
amendments to the Act as well, particularly section 2(3) .s
The court reasoned that "'Congress was aware of the potential
conflict between the obligations of foremen as representatives of their
employers, on the one hand, and as union members, on the other. Sec-
tion 2(3) evidences its intent to make the obligations to the employer
paramount.' "I' The court thus rejected a union contention that section
14(a) of the Act evidenced Congressional intent that supervisors be
controlled by the union that they join. The court felt that section 14(a)
"does not detract from the undivided loyalty [supervisors] owe to their
3430 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1970).
341d. at 1350 n.2.
-"See, e.g., Mailers Local 143, 181 N.L.R.B. 286 (1970), enforced Mailers Local 143 v.
NLRB, 445 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Carpenters Dist. Council, 177 N.L.R.B. 500 (1970), and
Carpenters Dist. Council, 176 N.L.R.B. 797 (1969), both enforced NLRB v. Carpenters Dist.
Council, 454 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972); Lithographers Local 15-P, 175 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1969),
enforced NLRB v. Lithographers Local 15-P, 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971).
3'No. 71-1559, at 9 (emphasis by the court).
"Id. at 9-10.
'-See note 18 supra.
"No. 71-1559, at 13, quoting Carpenters Dist. Council v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 564, 566 (1959).
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employer under section 8(b)(1)(B) .... Similarly the fact that an
employer may have consented to the compulsory union membership of
his supervisors .. .does not negate his right to the full protection of
section 8(b)(1)(B)."40
As to the effect of Allis-Chalmers, the union urged (and the dissent
agreed) that, inasmuch as the conduct for which the discipline was
imposed, i.e., working during a strike, was the same in both Allis-
Chalmers and IBEW, the former decision should control. The majority
distinguished the two cases by stating that the Supreme Court in Allis-
Chalmers drew "'cogent support' for its decision"4 from the proviso
to section 8(b)(1)(A), which applies only to internal, union-employee
relationships. The court noted that the proviso does not apply to section
8(b)(1)(B), the disputed section in IBEW, which regulates the external,
union-employer relationship. 2
Both the majority and the dissent viewed Scofield v. NLRB43 as
standing for the principle that unions may discipline members only when
such discipline impairs no national labor policy.44 The majority, how-
ever, found that Congress had expressed a policy in section 8(b)(1)(B)
of protecting employers against union interference with their supervi-
sors.45 The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the policy was not
violated when a union merely insured "strike solidarity among its mem-
bers."4"
The majority's interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(B) and the intent of
Congress undoubtedly reaches the correct result. It seems unlikely that
Congress would, on the one hand, legislatively recognize that supervi-
sors are different from employees and, at the same time, intend that
unions might treat them the same as employees, when such treatment
would interfere with their status as supervisors. Indeed, the limited
language of section 14(a) itself demonstrates Congress intended that
"Id. at 15-16. The dissent, on the other hand, argued that §§ 2(3) and 14(a) merely give the
employer the option to keep his supervisors out of the union or allow them to join and when he
elects the latter course he bargains away his right to their loyalty. Id. at 55-56 (Wright, J.,
dissenting).
4 Id. at 17.
12d. at 16-19.
43394 U.S. 423 (1969).
"No. 71-1559, at 19, 54.
"Id. at 20.
"Id. at 54 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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supervisor membership in unions would be something less than that of
protected employees.
47
There is little question that Congress intended to prevent union
interference with management's right to designate its bargaining repre-
sentatives, 8 and it would be specious to suggest that, once selected, the
representatives permissibly could be hindered by union discipline in
performing the duties for which they were selected. On the other hand,
it is doubtful Congress intended to prohibit legitimate enforcement of
union rules simply because the disciplined member may be a supervisor
rather than a rank-and-file employee. Nevertheless, the legislative lan-
guage selected by Congress to implement the former intent has been
stretched by the Meat Cutters and IBEW court to the point that the
latter intent is imperiled.
While section 8(b)(1)(B) does act as a limitation upon union disci-
pline of supervisor members, whether it operates as an absolute bar is
not clear. The court in both Meat Cutters and IBEW stated that not
all supervisor discipline will be proscribed,49 but it gives no workable
guidelines with which to determine what discipline will be permitted.
The lone example cited by the court was a Board decision, Painters
Local 453,50 in which the NLRB found no violation of section 8(b)(1)(B)
where one local union fined a supervisor member of a sister local for
violating a rule that required members of sister locals to register with
the fining local when working in its jurisdiction. Clearly, failure to
register was conduct outside the managerial duties of the supervisor. It
can be argued, however, that the rule did interfere with his work as a
supervisor in the jurisdiction of the fining local and with management's
right to select him to work in that capacity.
Another question left unanswered by IBEW or Meat Cutters is
whether the nature of the conduct for which discipline was imposed is
the decisive factor in determining whether there has been a violation of
section 8(b)(1)(B). In IBEW the court held that the conduct need not
tSee note 18 supra. This language also negates the IBEW dissenting argument that any
employer who agrees to compulsory union membership for his supervisors gives up all rights to
their loyalty. See note 40 supra. If an employer need not recognize supervisors as employees for
the purpose of any collective bargaining law he certainly waives no rights in that respect under the
very terms of section 14(a).
"SSee I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 427 (1948);
2 Id. at 1012, 1077.
"'No. 71-1559, at 15 n.28; 458 F.2d at 798-99 n.12.
"183 N.L.R.B. 24 (1970).
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be in the actual application of a bargaining agreement provision or
adjustment of a particular grievance; the discipline is proscribed any
time "a supervisor is disciplined by a union because of the manner in
which he exercised his supervisory or managerial authority . . .-.
This language would seem to suggest that the intent of a union is impor-
tant and that a court should determine if a union intended to coerce
management by its action or merely intended to discipline a member.
The court later stated, however, that it is immaterial "'whether the
coercion succeeded or failed[;] . . . the test is whether the. . . conduct
.. .tend[ed] to interfere with . .. [the rights protected] under the
Act.' "12 Thus even unintentional interference is seemingly proscribed if
it has the requisite effect.
The controlling question appears to be whether the conduct the
union seeks to restrain is essential to the supervisory function, but, as
the dissent in IBEW pointed out, a supervisor, by the very nature of his
alignment with management in opposition to labor, can commit few acts
to which the union would object that would not be construed as the
performance of his managerial duties. 3
While IBEW held that it is not necessary that the conduct for which
a supervisor is disciplined be restricted to acts committed in the actual
administration of the bargaining agreement or adjustment of griev-
ances, it is not clear whether a supervisor must have authority to per-
form such duties. It is possible, though perhaps rare, for a supervisor
to administer matters not covered by the bargaining agreement and to
have no role in the grievance process. For example, a union-member
foreman might have unlimited authority to allocate over-time work
among employees, a subject not covered by the bargaining agreement.
He also might not serve a designated function in the grievance proce-
dure. May the union order him to allocate over-time according to a
particular union-determined formula and permissibly fine him for re-
fusal to do so, or is any conduct performed as a representative of man-
"No. 71-1559, at 14.
521d. at 24, quoting Mine Workers Local 167 v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 538, 542 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
uE.g., a supervisor may be required by management to cross picket lines; work during a strike
(indeed, perform the duties of the striking workers as in IBEW); seek out permanent replacements
for the striking workers; implement lockouts; campaign against the union during a representation
election, or resolve jurisdictional disputes in opposition to the union's jurisdictional claim. In short,
union discipline is generally imposed to sanction conduct in opposition to the union's interest, and
opposing the union comprises a substantial amount of the supervisory function.
[Vol. 51
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agement exempt from discipline so long as the actor is a supervisor? The
NLRB, in a recent decision,54 has taken the latter view, stating that
"[a]ll persons who are 'supervisors' within the meaning of Section
2(1 1)"5 of the Act are employer's 'representatives for the purposes of
collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances' within the purview
of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act ... ."I' This can be viewed as an
outright ban on discipline of supervisor members.
Neither Meat Cutters nor IBEW considered the situation of tempo-
rary supervisors. In some industries (most notably construction) an
employee member of the union may work as a supervisor for a short
period of time, or for only one project, and then return to non-
managerial status either temporarily or permanently. It can be argued
that if he is no longer a supervisor, he no longer has the protection of
section 8(b)(1)(B), even against discipline for acts committed while he
was in a supervisory status. If he is permanently returned to non-
supervisory status, it is difficult to see how such discipline could coerce
or restrain employers in any future selection of their representatives. On
the other hand, a temporary supervisor who knows that his fine will be
merely suspended until he returns to non-supervisory status will be re-
luctant to carry out management's directives.
What effect the limitation on discipline will have on continued
supervisor membership in unions is speculative. Unions may lose inter-
est in representing members they cannot discipline, or supervisors may
become more interested in the benefits of membership without the
hazards of discipline. The limitation should have some effect, however,
upon the negotiation of union-shop clauses covering supervisors in fu-
ture bargaining. Management's primary reasons for not agreeing to
such a clause, that it would allow union control over management repre-
sentatives, has been virtually eliminated and there is little reason for
resistance. The union, on the other hand, may seek the clause as a
valuable aid to the acquisition of membership, but could not insist upon
"Engineers Local 501, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 91.
-NLRA § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970) provides:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward,
or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their griev-
ances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the
use of independent judgment.
11199 N.L.R.B. No. 91 at -
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its inclusion under the interpretation of Typographers Local 38 v.
NLRB.57 Management negotiators will be able to condition agreement
to the benign clause only upon receipt of a valuable concession by the
union.
JOHN 0. POLLARD
Securities Regulation-The Reincarnation of the Deception Requirement
Rule lOb-5 1 has been used to develop a corpus of federal law relat-
ing to fiduciary obligations of directors, officers, and majority share-
holders2 in an area that has traditionally been a subject for state rather
than federal regulation.3 Due to its broad language, the rule creates an
almost undefined liability. Absent definitive legislative action, courts
have assumed primary responsibility for defining the extent of liability.
In the recent case of Popkin v. Bishop,' the Second Circuit clearly
rejected imposition of rule 1Ob-5 liability in the absence of an allegation
of nondisclosure or deception in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities. This holding, reiterating nondisclosure as a fundamental
element in such an action, represents a significant restriction on the
expansion of rule lOb-5 into the area of corporate fiduciary obligations.
5 See notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra. Attention should be called to the fact that
Typographers Local 38 was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court. However, an opposite
decision in the near future seems unlikely.
117 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971):
It shall be unlawful...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to [make a misleading
omission]. . . or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
'See Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Entel
v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
'Some commentators have expressed concern about this intrusion. Compare Fleischer,
"Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965), with Lohf, The
Corporation Law of the Securities Acts: Federal Rights of Corporations, 36 U. COLO. L. REv. 76
(1963).
For a discussion of the fiduciary responsibilities of corporate management, see H. HENN,
CORPORATIONS §§ 235-41 (2d ed. 1970).
'464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
